Was Ayn Rand a Conservative?

Note: A 2005 Essay from Rebirth of Reason

Introduction

Some years ago I consulted a biographical dictionary for information on Ayn Rand. The dictionary described Rand as a “conservative.” Rand, as we know, did not consider herself a conservative. She called herself a “radical for capitalism.” In addition, many of her views were contrary to those of mainstream conservatism. She was an atheist and a fierce critic of religion. She advocated abortion on demand and refused to support Ronald Reagan because of his ties to the religious right. (Letters of Ayn Rand, p. 666) Nor can one forget that National Review rejected Rand in 1957 with Whittaker Chambers’ scathing review of Atlas Shrugged, entitled “Big Sister is Watching You.” To Chambers, Objectivism was just another variation of atheistic materialism.

At the same time, the occasional references to Rand as a conservative call for explanation. As I hope to show, while the term “conservative” is inappropriate for Rand, her similarities to conservatism should not be ignored either. There is a broad “conservative ethos” which pervades Rand’s writings, particularly when read in the context of the Cold War and the 1960s.

Ayn Rand’s “Conservatism”

The idea that Rand was a conservative probably results from a focus on her advocacy of capitalism in isolation from the rest of her thought. Certainly, belief in free enterprise is a staple of most conservatives' thought, even if they don’t advocate consistent laissez-faire. In addition, Rand supported free enterprise because she believed in rational self-interest. She also thought that the individual pursuit of self-interest would lead to social and economic improvement. This theme (which goes back to thinkers such as Adam Smith) has echoes in conservative thought, with its opposition to a centrally planned economy. In addition to supporting free enterprise, Rand was staunchly opposed to communism, socialism, and the Soviet Union. During the charged days of the Cold War, anyone denouncing communism would likely be called conservative.

Another reason Rand might be considered a conservative is that some of her views on moral theory and individual moral issues also find echoes in conservative thought. Rand advocated moral absolutes and rejected cultural relativism. In spite of her irreligion and her contempt for supernatural ethics, many of her views were fairly conventional. She opposed homosexuality, considering it “immoral” and “disgusting.” She famously stated that a rational woman would not want to be president since “the essence of femininity is hero worship—the desire to look up to a man.” (The Voice of Reason, p. 268) And, say what you will about Rand’s affair with Nathaniel Branden, she was not a “libertine” in her private life.

It is also interesting to observe how Rand allies herself with the middle class in opposition to the intellectuals and the “counter culture.” In her essay “Apollo and Dionysus,” Rand discussed Apollo 11 and the Woodstock music festival, and placed herself on the side of the middle class. “[T]he people are reality-oriented, commonsense-oriented, technology-oriented ...” (Return of the Primitive (“ROP”), p. 102) She denounced the “hippies” who attended Woodstock. In fact, “hippie” seems to have been a favorite term of derision for her, used for both Kant (“the first hippie in history”) and anarcho-capitalists (“hippies of the right”). (ROP, p. 105)

There are other issues on which Rand sided with conservatives and the middle class. She opposed modern art for its reduction of “man’s consciousness to the level of sensations.” (Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, pp. 76-77) The conservative critique of modern art is often similar. Richard Weaver discusses contemporary art's focus on the artist’s desire to escape “form,” “responsibility,” and “direction.” According to Weaver, much contemporary art is “nominalistic” and attempts to free the lower levels of the mind from constraint. (Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences, pp. 87, 89, 90-91)

Rand also attacked progressive education and its chief theoretician, John Dewey, both frequent targets of conservatives. (ROP, p. 68) Incidentally, Russell Kirk begins a critique of John Dewey with a mention of Rand. Kirk’s description of Dewey is reminiscent of Rand’s critique of progressive education:

Dewey was bent, though perhaps only half-consciously, on creating an impersonal society: that is, a society in which strong personalities would be eliminated. For there is no personality, really, except inner personality, subjective personality; if, then, its perfection is denounced as rotten, human beings are expected to efface personality altogether. They become “other-directed men.” Lacking belief, loyalty, and self-reliance ... they are moved only by fad and foible, and are blown about by every wind of doctrine. Objectivity of this sort terminates in pusillanimity. (Kirk, Enemies of the Permanent Things, p. 159)

Not only did Rand denounce progressive education, but also sided with government authority and private property in the context of the student “rebellions” of the 1960s.

It is important to remember that most of Rand’s philosophical essays were published in the 1960s and therefore during the Cold War and the rise of the “counter culture.” In this context, someone such as Rand who defended private property, educational standards, and self-restraint was likely to be seen as conservative, if not reactionary. A superficial reading of Rand probably led many conservatives to believe that Rand was a fellow traveler or even a fellow conservative. In fact, a member of the Young Americans for Freedom wrote to Rand in 1965 asking for permission to name a chapter of the YAF after her, which she refused. (Letters, p. 635)

Anti-Egalitarianism

In my essay “A Common Thread: Anti-Egalitarianism in Objectivism, Conservatism, and Libertarianism,” I argued that Rand, along with conservatives and libertarians, holds human inequality to be fundamental. She argues that in a free society, those with superior ability will inevitably form something of an elite based on merit. This hierarchy, however, does not work to the detriment of the less able: in fact, it works to their benefit. She called this the “pyramid of ability” principle. The following statement, by British conservative W. H. Mallock in 1894, could have been written by Rand:

Equality benefits no one. It frustrates men of talent; and it reduces the poor to a poverty still more abject .... For inequality produces the wealth of civilized communities: it provides the motive which induces men of superior benefit to exert themselves for the general benefit. (Mallock, Labour and the Popular Welfare, p. 233)

A belief in hierarchy is central to conservative thought as well. In Continental thought, Church and aristocracy are predominant; in its American version the self-made man (often a businessman) is upheld for praise. I recall that, during the 1980s, the Left denounced Ronald Reagan for his “Horatio Alger” belief that the “little guy” could rise to the level of a successful businessman. Rand, of course, disagreed with traditional state-imposed hierarchies such as existed in Europe. An Objectivist society would be a hierarchy of merit, but it would be no less hierarchical.

The State

Libertarians, particularly those of the anarcho-capitalist variety, have on occasion called Rand a conservative. Rand advocated laissez-faire capitalism and a minimal state. She was, to use the recently coined term, a “minarchist.” She considered anarchy highly impractical and ridiculed the idea of “competing governments” as worse than a “floating abstraction.” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 131-32)

Rand certainly was not an apologist for the state. At the same time, her discussions of government don’t reveal the depth of hostility (or even skepticism) toward the state that characterizes many libertarians. Consider the well-known statement of Albert Jay Nock:

Taking the State wherever found, striking into its history at any point, one sees no way to differentiate the activities of its founders, administrators and beneficiaries from those of a professional-criminal class.

It is difficult to find a statement by Rand as critical of the state as this one, and many Objectivists have adopted her attitude.[1] Contrary to anarcho-capitalists, Rand viewed the state as an improvement over anarchy. (See Nicholas Dykes, “Anarchism and Objectivism,” JARS, Vol. 7, No. 1)

In libertarian critiques of Rand as a conservative, reference is often made to Rand’s belief that big businessmen were America’s “persecuted minority,” and the essay of that name published in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. As her libertarian critics point out, it is difficult to describe big businessmen—with their tax-subsidies, restrictive tariffs, and the like—as “persecuted.” Leftist and libertarian historians have shown that many interventions in the economy were first introduced at the behest of big business. Murray Rothbard argues that most big businessmen have long made their peace with big government out of self-interest. As Rothbard concludes:

Persecuted? With a few honorable exceptions, big business jostles one another eagerly to line up at the public trough. Does Lockheed, or General Dynamics, or AT&T, or Nelson Rockefeller feel persecuted? (For a New Liberty, Rev. ed., p. 309)

It should be mentioned, however, that at times Rand was skeptical about the goals of businessmen. In essays such as “The Roots of War” and “The New Fascism: Rule by Consensus,” she understood the role many businessmen played in undermining capitalism and advocating imperialism. Rand may seem conservative to many libertarians[2], but as a description of her political theory this is imprecise. Chris Sciabarra has shown that Rand’s views on this question are reasonably close to the standard libertarian critique. He urges Objectivists to reclaim Rand’s “radical” legacy.

Conclusion

Ayn Rand was not a conservative. However, certain conservative themes pervade her work.[3]

[1] Consider, for example, that much of Official Objectivism accepts the government’s rationale for the war in Iraq.

[2] For example, Rand’s support for intellectual property, laws against slander and libel, and (from what I’ve read second-hand) compulsory subpoenas probably place her on the “conservative” spectrum of minarchist opinion.

[3] Rand’s limited conservatism is not unusual in the libertarian movement. Ludwig von Mises was something of a social conservative, as was Murray Rothbard. Friedrich von Hayek famously wrote an essay entitled “Why I Am Not a Conservative.” Yet when asked by how he would classify his politics, he responded “Old Whig.” (Russell Kirk, The Sword of Imagination, pp. 198-99)

A Common Thread: Anti-Egalitarianism in Objectivism, Conservatism, and Libertarianism

A 2004 Essay From Rebirth of Reason

Introduction

Matthew Humphreys, in an interesting article, draws attention to the fact that many Objectivists and libertarians feel a greater affinity to the contemporary Right than the Left. Mr. Humphreys notes that there are various “currents of thought” found in the Right with which Objectivists and libertarians can make common cause.
One current of thought (which Mr. Humphreys doesn’t discuss) between these three traditions is their opposition to egalitarianism. Although not an easy concept to define, I take egalitarianism to mean the belief that all people are (or can be) equal in intelligence and worth and that society should attempt to promote equality (particularly of income) among people. On a cultural level, egalitarians often assert that all societies and cultures are of equal value.
I will discuss the opposition to egalitarianism focusing on the works of three American authors who each represent one tradition: Russell Kirk, Ayn Rand, and Murray Rothbard. In spite of their differences on many issues of fundamental importance, there is a common thread of anti-egalitarianism running throughout their writings.

Conservatism: Russell Kirk

The twentieth century’s leading American conservative author was Russell Kirk (1918-1994). Although Kirk was a frequent critic of Rand and Rothbard, his critique of egalitarianism was similar. In one of his later essays, Kirk rejects the concept of “equality of condition” by which he means the “equality of incomes and other awards.” (Kirk does not reject the idea that people should be equal before the law.) [Kirk, Redeeming the Time, p. 217.] He states:

In short, I have been arguing that it is profoundly unjust to endeavor to transform society into a table land of equality. It would be unjust to the energetic, reduced to equality with the clack and indolent; it would be unjust to the thrift, compelled to make up losses of the profligate; it would be unjust to those take the long view, forced to submit to the domination of a majority interested chiefly in short-run results. [Id., p. 225.]

According to Kirk, the drive for equality has resulted in high taxation, a decline in educational standards, and multiculturalism.

Objectivism: Ayn Rand

Needles to say, Ayn Rand (1905-1982) was not an egalitarian. Her novels depict a world divided between the good and the evil, the intelligent and the stupid, and the strong and the cowardly. Although she was skeptical of genetic and racial differences in character and intelligence, she was clear that human beings and cultures differ in many respects and equality was neither possible nor desirable.
Perhaps Rand’s fullest exposition of her anti-egalitarianism is found in her 1971 essay “The Age of Envy.” Her criticism of egalitarianism is somewhat similar to Kirk’s and she sees similar consequences, including multiculturalism (although she didn’t use the term) and a decline in educational standards. [Rand, Return of the Primitive, pp. 140-49.]
In “Galt Speaks,” Rand advances what Objectivists call the “pyramid of ability principle,” namely that those less capable benefit when the more capable are allowed to advance to the limit of their abilities. [Rand, For the New Intellectual, pp. 185-86.] This concept is not unique to Rand, and Kirk quotes the British conservative W. H. Mallock to the same effect in his 1894 book Labour and the Popular Welfare: “Equality benefits no one. It frustrates men of talent; and it reduces the poor to a poverty still more abject. . . . For inequality produces the wealth of civilized communities: it provides the motive which induces men of superior benefit to exert themselves for the general benefit.”

Libertarianism: Murray Rothbard

Murray Rothbard (1926-1995), the last century’s most important libertarian thinker, was likewise a staunch opponent of egalitarianism, who attributed to egalitarianism many of the same ills as Kirk and Rand. Indeed, two of Rothbard’s most important essays were “Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature” and “Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism, and the Division of Labor.” Rothbard sees similar results flowing from the egalitarian agenda:

Equality of condition would reduce humanity to an anthill existence. Fortunately, the individuated nature of man . . . makes the ideal of total equality unattainable. But an enormous amount of damage – the crippling of individuality, as well as economic and social destruction – could be generated in the attempt.

[Rothbard, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, and Other Essays, p. 279.]
Throughout Rothbard’s vast cultural criticism, he exposed the egalitarian fallacies behind “Women’s Liberation,” multiculturalism, and “progressive education.” In particular, his attack on progressive education mirrors Rand’s critique, focusing on the political, cultural, and “epistemological” aspects of this movement. [Rothbard, Education: Free and Compulsory, pp. 53-55.]

Conclusion

How this common opposition to egalitarianism “plays out” in contemporary politics is beyond the scope of this brief article.[1] Yet, anti-egalitarianism constitutes a common thread among the Objectivist, libertarian, and conservative traditions.

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[1] Likewise, there is not space to discuss the common influences on these thinkers. Kirk, Rothbard, and Rand each read (and approved) of Ortega y Gasset's The Revolt of the Masses. They also read Schoeck's Envy (although Rand didn't appear to approve of it, judging from the Marginalia).

Can Objectivism Be Criticized?

Recently, on Diana Hsieh’s podcast, a listener asked Hsieh and her co-host Greg Perkins a question about criticisms of Objectivism and their opinion of Scott Ryan’s 2003 work, Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality. Hsieh holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Colorado. Both Hsieh and Perkins are (or were) supporters of the Ayn Rand Institute.

Hsieh said she hasn’t read Ryan’s book. Perkins said that with “no exception” all the criticisms he had read of Objectivism are either “blatantly dishonest” or “based on a misunderstanding.” Perkins went on to say that he read parts of the book and concluded that Ryan was not dishonest but rather, you guessed it, didn’t understand Objectivism.

Hsieh said that criticisms of a philosophy have limited value. What is most important is whether a philosophy corresponds to the “facts of reality” and whether its principles fit with “my experience.” She did make the point that, regardless of what one thinks about established philosophies such as Kantianism and Utilitarianism, there are certain legitimate criticisms that provide a good jumping off point for discussion. On the other hand, she maintains, Objectivism hasn’t been around long enough for good critiques to develop. She then agreed with Perkins that none of Rand’s critics understand Objectivism well enough to critique it.

This is a rather striking assertion. Objectivism has been a complete philosophy since at least 1968, when the essays making up Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology were published. In the forty-three years following Objectivism has been studied by numerous supporters, sympathizers and critics. Many of these people have Ph.D.s in philosophy. Is it really the case that no one other than a philosopher associated with the ARI understands Objectivism well-enough to comment on it? Rand’s supporters always tell us (as Leonard Peikoff put it) that Rand was the greatest “salesman” philosophy ever knew. She wrote in a clear language understandable to the common man. Yet at the same time her writings are apparently so difficult to understand that not even professional philosophers can understand them. Which is it? I’d also add that it’s not as if Rand wrote a tremendous amount of pure philosophy. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology is 163 pages. The Virtue of Selfishness is 144 pages. The Romantic Manifesto is 187 pages. Throw in Galt’s Speech and the non-dated pieces in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal and it’s not more than 800 pages. Compare this to the vast corpus of John Dewey (thirty seven volumes in the collected works) and Bertrand Russell, two writers on which Rand opined without reading more than a small fraction of their relevant work. Most of Rand’s critics have probably read her key essays several times over, so if they don’t understand them maybe it’s because Rand isn’t as clear as her acolytes claim.

That being said, I think it’s the case that two of the earliest critiques of Objectivism by philosophers, William O’Neill’s With Charity Toward None (1971) and John Robbins’ Answer to Ayn Rand (1974), did not always show the best understanding of Objectivism. However, things got much better with 1986’s The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, a collection of essays edited by Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen. All of the essays were written by professional philosophers, some of whom are well-known such as Antony Flew and Wallace Matson. In 1999 the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies began publishing, providing a forum for scholars of diverse perspectives to dialogue on Rand’s philosophy and related matters. In 2002 Greg Nyquist published Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature. In 2003 Scott Ryan published Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand’s Epistemology. While neither is a professional philosopher, both are well read in philosophy and, in their own ways, expand on the various critiques others have made.

I won’t summarize all the criticisms of Objectivism, but I think there are a number of stock objections put forward by more than one philosopher that are reasonable based on any “objective” reading of Rand’s philosophy

1. Theory of Concepts. This has been one of the most commented on aspects of Objectivism, in part because it is supposedly Rand’s greatest breakthrough. Just some of the objections: Rand presents no evidence that her theory is true; Rand provides no evidence to support her speculations about how the mind of children and animals work; Rand confuses the problems of universals with the different question of abstraction and concept formation; Rand’s theory of measurement omission cannot explain how certain abstract concepts such as “justice” are formed, nor can it explain the formation of mathematical or logical concepts.

2. Epistemology. Rand’s epistemology doesn’t seem all that well developed. However a standard critique is that Rand’s use of the stolen concept fallacy may show that skepticism is self-refuting; it does not show that the senses are generally reliable or provide us with the means of determining when our judgments about the external world are accurate. (As at least a couple of critics have mentioned, Rand herself became irate when informed by Joan Blumenthal that the tree she thought she saw outside her hospital window was really an IV pole.)

3. Ethics. This has gathered a lot of attention as well since it may be the most novel part of Objectivism. The standard critique is that Rand switches between life as the standard of value and a certain kind of life (rational and non-parasitic) as the standard. Rand is thus able to ignore obvious counterexamples such as the rational parasite who lives off the independence and intelligence of others. It also leads Objectivists to the rather odd conclusion that certain people who are apparently alive and well are “not really living” or even “dead.”

4. Politics. Perhaps the most common objection is that Rand’s advocacy of selfishness cannot provide a foundation for respecting the rights of others. There are various other criticisms such as whether voluntary contributions are sufficient to fund even a minimal state and why anarcho-capitalism is not more consistent with Rand’s politics than limited government.

5. Religion. Here the standard objection is that Rand (and most of her followers) don’t understand religion and theistic arguments well enough to critique them. Rand’s positive arguments for naturalism are weak, e.g., “existence exists” doesn’t preclude the existence of God or gods.

There is, I think, a more fundamental problem. Although Objectivists tell us how stunningly original Rand was, most of her ideas and even the way she defends them are quite similar to other thinkers and schools of philosophy. For example, as Harry Binswanger once admitted, “Objectivism is a version of empiricism.” As such it is subject to the standard criticisms of empiricism, in particular the difficulty of explaining necessity, mathematics and logic without the aid of a priori knowledge. Another example is Rand’s belief that man’s mind is tabula rasa, which makes it subject to various objections from evolutionary psychology.

As I final point, in light of all the schisms, excommunications and denunciations in Objectivism since 1968 it’s not clear who really does understand Objectivism. Recently Leonard Peikoff denounced historian of science John McCaskey over the application of Rand’s theory of concept formation to the problem of induction and its role in the history of science. Travis Norsen, who holds a Ph.D. in physics, came to McCaskey’s defense. If an Objectivist historian of science and an Objectivist physicist can’t get issues right in their own field whereas Leonard Peikoff (who has expertise in neither) can, what’s the hope for the rest of us? Indeed Peikoff has in recent years said that Objectivists who believe Moslems have a right to build an Islamic community center containing a Mosque in New York City or were considering voting Republican or abstaining in 2006 don’t understand Objectivism. Apparently Hsieh doesn’t understand Objectivism because she dissented over the Mosque issue and at least partially sided with McCaskey. Peikoff slammed Hsieh in a statement he since removed from his website.

I would mention that Hsieh and Perkins are a little extreme even by orthodox Objectivist standards here. As readers of ARCHN blog might recall, ARI scholar Onkar Ghate debated philosopher Michael Huemer a couple of years ago over Rand’s ethics. Last year saw the publication of a first volume in a series of papers arising out of Ayn Rand Society meetings. The first volume, edited by orthodox Objectivist Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox contains essays by non-Objectivists Paul Bloomfield, Christine Swanton, Helen Cullyer and Lester Hunt. ARI associated scholars Tara Smith and Darryl Wright engage in friendly dialogue with their essays.

Edwin Locke Critiques Goddess of the Market

Edwin Locke has critiqued Jennifer Burns’ 2009 intellectual biography of Ayn Rand. In general, I think the review is very unfair. Here are some of the problems.

4. p. 11: Burns says Ayn Rand “escaped into French children’s magazines.” Ayn Rand’s love of (certain) fiction was not escapism but part of her search, even as a young girl, for interesting plots and the ideal man. This is explained clearly in Shoshana Milgram’s chapter (“Who Was John Galt? The Creation of Ayn Rand’s Ultimate Ideal Man”) in Robert Mayhew’s edited book Essays on Ayn Rand’s “Atlas Shrugged” (which book Burns must have read because she mentions it in her Notes).

Oh for crying out loud. The context was that Rand didn't have a particularly happy childhood in part because she was too intellectual to connect with other children. Burns goes on to point that Rand was writing stories at the time and entertaining her sisters with her latest tales. She was even able to get the respect of her fellow students.

5. p. 16: Burns cites a quote from a cousin of Ayn Rand’s who said: Nietzsche “beat you to all your ideas.” But Burns does not mention here that the claim was not true. Even later in the book Burns indicates she does not get it (p.303-4, Note 4). Ayn Rand’s view of Nietzsche was made clear in her introduction to the 25th anniversary edition of The Fountainhead. For a time when she was younger she admired Nietzsche, but as she developed her own
philosophy, she came to totally reject Nietzsche’s philosophy, because was it mystical and irrational—the complete antithesis of her own philosophy. She admired certain quotes from Nietzsche such as “the noble soul has reverence for itself.” Ironically, such a quote could not even be rationally defended without Ayn Rand’s philosophy at its base. Nietzsche’s alleged individualism had nothing in common with Ayn Rand’s which was based on reason. Nietzsche may have called for a new morality, but he did not provide one. Ayn Rand did.

I suggest people read the entire note that Locke references. I don't have time to type it all in, but Burns does mention the profound difference between Rand and Nietzsche. I'll quote the final two sentences:

Yet I approach the question of influence from a different angle, focusing primarile on Nietzsche's transvaluation of values and his call for a new morality. From this perspective, though, Rand's reliance on Nietzsche lessened over time, her entire career might be considered a '"Nietzsche phase."

6. p. 22: Burns discusses Ayn Rand’s rejection by a Russian boy named Levy and concludes: “To desire was to need, and Rand wanted to need nobody.” Bad writing aside, this is an equivocation about the meaning of need. Ayn Rand argued that to have a successful romantic relationship, you need self-esteem—you need to have a self (see The Fountainhead and Galt’s speech). Others cannot not fill the void of zero self-esteem for you. But, given that base, Ayn Rand certainly believed strongly in romantic love (and friendship)—as her life and her novels clearly demonstrated. For example, Howard Roark says to Dominique in The Fountainhead (p. 376), “I’ve given you, not my sacrifice or my pity, but my ego and my naked need.” Ayn Rand’s long and loving relationship with her husband has been well documented (e.g., see Mary Ann and Charles Sures’ Facets of Ayn Rand).

This is in the context of a letter written by Rand's mother to Rand while she was in Chicago reporting her anger that Rand didn't write in several months.

So Rand's feelings concerning a highschool crush gone unfulfilled and tensions with her family are to be explained by novels written decades later?

7. p. 42: In a very brief reference to Ayn Rand’s ethics, Burns writes that AynRand exalted “a psychological mindset utterly divorced from anything outside the self.” This totally misstates Ayn Rand’s position. Taken literally, Burns’s view would detach the mind from reality which would be a state of psychosis.

What Ayn Rand held was that in every issue of one’s life one should think for oneself and not sacrifice one’s mind, one’s judgment and one’s life to others. Thinking requires that one focus on reality, including the value of other people whom one deals with.

Here I agree that this is an imprecise characterization of Rand's thought. That being said, Burns' discussion is much better.

Actually this is not a "very brief" reference to Rand's ethics - it is at least a couple pages long, which may explain Locke's concern. For example, Burns reference her previous discussion of Rand's admiration of William Hickman, a murderer who dismembered his victim.

9. p. 63: Burns says that Ayn Rand viewed capitalism as “the solution to all ills.” Clearly, Burns is taking conventional literary license here, but again, it is a careless formulation. What Burns should have said here is that Ayn Rand held that capitalism is the solution to poverty or, more broadly, the only means of large-scale wealth creation. (Of course, more fundamentally, Ayn Rand regarded it as the only moral economic system.) The closest thing to a solution to all ills would be her entire philosophy.

Actually, the reference here is to Rand's 1930's piece "Manifesto of Individualism" written around the time of the Wilkie campaign and not a description of her mature philosophy. This piece hasn't been published. Has Locke read it?

15. p. 90: Burns describes The Fountainhead as “a strange book . . . moody, and feverish.” No reasons are given for these assertions. In contrast, Burns presents quotes showing why people loved the book. Somehow readers failed to see the book in the snide way Burns did. No explanation for these conflicting views is given.

Here is what Burns wrote in full:

That Bobbs-Merrill failed to anticipate the book's success is understandable. The Fountainhead is a strange book, long, moody, feverish. Even after Rand's last-minute editing it took up nearly seven hundred pages.

What was it that readers found in The Fountainhead's pages? At the most basic level the book told an exciting story, and told it well. When freighted with Rand's symbolic connotations, architecture became exciting and lively.

1. Looking at the material that Locke omits it's clear that "strange" isn't equivalent to bad, as Locke implies. It's more like "unusual."

2. There is no contrast between an allegedly negative evaluation of the book by Burns and a positive evaluation of the readers. Burns likes the book and shares Rand's readers' admiration for it.

17. p. 97: The heading of Part ll of Burns’s book is “From Novelist to Philosopher.” Again this is seriously off the mark. If Burns had studied Ayn Rand more carefully, she would have known that Ayn Rand’s literary goal was to present the ideal man (or woman). She recognized, unlike most, if not all, other writers, that to present an ideal you had to have a philosophy. Ayn Rand was philosophical from an early age. So her development was not one of
going from novelist to philosopher, but rather of formulating her philosophy more clearly and in more detail as she wrote her novels. Her philosophy is at the base of all of her books. It was the full development of her philosophy that enabled her to characterize the heroes (and villains) in Atlas Shrugged and to formulate the book’s theme.

Actually, the heading of Part II is "From Novelist to Philosopher, 1944-1957"

It's just a heading.

20. p. 128: Burns writes, “Rand’s theory of natural rights was based on fiat, on her stating it must be so.” This is totally false. Her theory was not a theory of “natural rights” in the Lockean sense at all. She does not derive it from man in a state of nature. Her theory of rights was based on man’s nature as a rational being, the morality of egoism, and the requirements of man’s survival in society. She wrote two whole articles on rights (see The Virtue of Selfishness and see also Galt’s speech, both of which Burns knew about). This is just poor scholarship."

A couple points here.

1. This is in a context of a letter from Isabel Paterson to Rand, long before her mature theory of rights was worked out.

2. In fact, I think the claim that Rand's theory was "based on fiat" is Paterson's evaluation of it. Two sentences later read, "Paterson concluded her letter with another snide remark."

22. pp. 151ff: Burns gives a great deal of press to Murray Rothbard, who showed an early interest in Ayn Rand’s ideas but who later came to advocate anarchism. Burns indicates that Ayn Rand disagreed, but Burns does not make clear in this part of the book Ayn Rand’s full view: that anarchism as a political system is totally irrational and can only lead to dictatorship. (Apparently Rothbard also believed in instincts and the primacy of emotions [p.153], which is further evidence of his irrationality.) Perhaps Rothbard’s most egregious error is the claim that “the good stuff in Ayn Rand’s system is not Ayn’s original contribution at all.” This is totally false but Burns never says so. There is a special issue of The Objectivist Forum, edited by Harry Binswanger (which magazine Burns evidently did not discover in her research) that shows Ayn Rand’s original contributions in every sphere of philosophy (and even other fields like psychology). Burns also includes many snide comments by Rothbard, calling her students (who were known, in jest, as “The Collective”) as “a group of lifeless acolytes” and a “passive, dependent group.” Now I happen to personally know some of the people in this group, though not all of them. Their goal was quite simple: to learn from someone whose philosophical knowledge was light years above theirs. This required them to have active, questioning minds. Passive acceptance would not have enabled them to learn anything. Rothbard was an irrationalist and a subjectivist, but for Burns all ideas are treated as pretty much equal.

1. "But who later came to advocate anarchism." According to Rothbard's semi-autobiographical work he was an anarchist by the time he met Rand.

2. "Apparently, Rothbard also believed in instincts . . ." Big deal. Objectivists are just about the only ones I know who don't think human beings have instincts. In fact, Rothbard denied that human beings have innate knowledge

3. "and in the primacy of emotions." It's not clear from Burns' book whether "primacy of emotions" was Rothbard's term. Emotions are more like "tastes" taken in the context of the discussion. According to Rothbard, to deny this is to deny individuality. She quotes Rothbard as saying that, based on Rand's ethics, "there is not reason . . . why Ayn shouldn't sleep with Nathan." (I'm reminded of George Reisman's quote that Rand could have a rational reason for preferring vanilla to chocolate ice cream.)

4. "Perhaps Rothbard’s most egregious error is the claim that 'the good stuff in Ayn Rand’s system is not Ayn’s original contribution at all.' This is totally false but Burns never says so. There is a special issue of The Objectivist Forum, edited by Harry Binswanger (which magazine Burns evidently did not discover in her research) that shows Ayn Rand’s original contributions in every sphere of philosophy . . . . "

Well Locke is entitled to disagree, but Burns had access to Rand's papers and is entitled to conclude (if she does) that Rand wasn't as original as she claimed. This is the view of every non-Objectivist intellectual historian I know.

5. "Burns also includes many snide comments by Rothbard, calling her students (who were known, in jest, as 'The Collective') as 'a group of lifeless acolytes' and a 'passive, dependent group.'

Well, Rothbard seemed to have some first-hand knowledge of the students. I think everyone would agree there was a conformist attitude in the 50's and 60's. In the ARI-sponsored 100 Voices there is someone interviewed who says that Rand's students all bought the same type of kitchen set as Rand and another interviewee who said everyone was smoking cigarettes and acting like Rand and Dagney.

6. "Rothbard was an irrationalist and a subjectivist . . . " Locke presents no proof of this and if he had read Rothbard's works he would know better.

7. "but for Burns all ideas are treated as pretty much equal." What is the justification for this statement? That Burns appears to believe that Rand's philosophy is not completely unique and falls within a liberal or natrual law tradition doesn't mean that she believes all ideas are "pretty much equal."

23. p. 156: Burns says Ayn Rand wanted to keep her affair with Branden secret due to having “a streak of cultural conventionality.” Anyone who seriously studied Ayn Rand would have to know that she had no such streak. The obvious reason for keeping the affair secret was to protect her privacy.

1. How does Locke know that Rand kept the affair secret to protect her privacy?

2. Rand had no streak of cultural conventionality? Well, she denouced homosexuality as "disgusting and immoral," described her enemies as "hippies," kept her adulterous affair secret, described nurses who took care of her as "kids in miniskirts," voted for Richard Nixon etc. Sounds rather conventional to me.

37. p. 223: Burns reports that Branden’s affair with Patrecia Wynand “lit the fuse that would blow Objectivism sky high.” But this affair did not affect the philosophy of Objectivism one iota. It simply upset some people. Somehow Burns cannot separate Objectivist ideas from the irrational actions of specific individuals.

Oh give me a break. Burns is obviously referring the Objectivist movement centered around the NBI. Is Locke really so "concrete bound"?

39. pp. 234–5: Burns seems to think that Ayn Rand should have presented her philosophical ideas as one opinion, then presented other opinions, then claimed uncertainty, and then let the students figure it out for themselves. But why would Ayn Rand even consider this if she knew she was right (and had proved it)? Clearly Burns resents the idea of certainty, in line with current intellectuals. But denying certainty would have made Objectivism into a useless joke. Imagine Ayn Rand starting a lecture with: “Here are the axioms of philosophy and here is how I validate them—but, hey, maybe I am wrong so you decide.” Burns thinks certainty promotes dogmatism (p. 237), but in reality dogmatism is the enemy of real (rational) certainty, because dogmatism necessarily relies on the arbitrary, e.g., belief on the basis of faith, which can only be sustained by evasion.

The discussion referenced by Locke is lengthy and I can only encourage people to read what Dr. Burns writes and compare it to what Locke says Burns "seems to think." It is the least chartiable reading of something I can imagine.

Burns' point is not that Rand shouldn't claim certainty for her ideas. Rather, Burns thinks that Rand's attitude discouraged the kind of give and take that helps people learn independently and ultimately arrive at certainty by their own thought process.

42. p. 242: Burns claims Barbara Branden was rejected by Ayn Rand because Barbara tried to defend Nathan after the affair with Patrecia was uncovered. This may be Barbara’s story, but in fact, she turned against Ayn Rand when it became clear to her that she could no longer use her association with Ayn Rand to make money. Why did Burns choose to believe Barbara’s story and not Ayn Rand’s when Burns admits (in her “Essay on Sources”) that the
Brandens had revenge motivation and had biases and false statements in their books? (Burns presents no evidence that Ayn Rand was anything but 100 percent honest.)

1. How does Locke know that Barbara's story is wrong, but Rand's is right? What work has he done in the archives? Has he even read her book, or just relied on Valliant's BS?

2. "Why did Burns choose to believe Barbara’s story and not Ayn Rand’s when Burns admits (in her “Essay on Sources”) that the Brandens had revenge motivation and had biases and false statements in their books? "

This is what Burns says: http://jenniferburns.org/blog/...

In my first stage of research, one of my primary goals was simply verifying if the essentials of the Brandens’ stories were correct. I was surprised to discover how accurate both books were. I did not discover any major errors or distortions in basic chronology or timing. I viewed the first series of correspondence between Rand and Nathan Blumenthal, and Barbara Weidman’s letters to Rand when she was away from her (the two later changed their names to Barbara and Nathaniel Branden). All of this material matched the accounts in the memoirs: here was the story of early difficulties in the relationship between Barbara and Nathan, for the reasons described; Nathan’s turbulent relationship with his family; the inflammatory letter he wrote to the UCLA newspaper (which I quote in my book), and so forth.

3. "Burns presents no evidence that Ayn Rand was anything but 100 percent honest." Actually she does. She credits Henry Holzer's statement that Rand's claim in To Whom It May Concern about Nathaniel's alleged financial fraud were untrue.

43. p. 244: About the split with the Brandens, Burns quotes one student as saying, “The rationally ordered universe NBI students sought and found in Rand was no more.” Wasn’t it? Where did it go? The rationally ordered universe was not based on people but on ideas. The ideas were there, on paper, for anyone who wanted them.

Another mistake. This is straight Burns, not a quote from a student. The previous sentence does contain a quote about To Whom It May Concern, but is from a "fan."

In any event, does Locke dispute that many young people tried to find "new home" (for lack of a better expression) in the NBI subculture and had doubts about Objectivism when the Split happened?

46. p. 269: “Rand had become increasingly unpleasant, querulous, and rigid as the years progressed.” There is no documentation for this claim. I only met her late in her life. I was fortunate enough to take her non-fiction writing course and had two conferences with her regarding papers I had written. She was unfailingly gracious and delighted to answer questions about her novels and philosophy. If she disagreed with something I wrote, she always politely explained her reasons. Ayn Rand, of course, could get angry (though she did not at me). But Burns does not understand why. Ayn Rand took ideas seriously; most people do not. She also understood in the most fundamental terms the consequences of irrational ideas for man’s life; for most people wrong ideas were just floating abstractions disconnected from reality.

Furthermore, Ayn Rand withstood decades of smears and denunciations from the intellectual establishment. In 100 percent of the instances that I am aware of, they misrepresented her ideas, often in the most grotesque manner (e.g., claiming her views were the actual opposite of what they were). Nevertheless, she never became bitter, never refused to explain her ideas (as long as the questioner was polite) and never deviated from her philosophy. She was inflexible in holding to her rational convictions against the most outrageous attacks. This is an aspect of her greatness—an aspect that Burns does not see at all.

Burns' evaluation of Rand's difficult side in later years may not be documented at this point in the book (or even in other places) but it is in fact documented. Just read that account of Allan and Joan Blumenthal in The Passion of Ayn Rand. (Not even Jim Valliant disputes the Blumenthals' report.)

No one disputes that Rand was a nice person most of the time. The evidence indicates the closer one got to Rand's inner circle the more difficult, controlling and demanding she became. There is no reason to think Locke would have witnessed much of this.

Obviously Burns understands the Peikovian take on Rand's anger (she was only upset at the irrationality in the world). Her years in the Archives an interviews with Rand's associates has led to a different conclusion.

48. p. 280: In her epilogue, Burns sinks into maliciousness (see also points 49 and 50). She argues that the Showtime television movie about Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden, written by an enemy, Barbara Branden, “destroyed the vaunted image of Ayn Rand as an intellectual paragon who lived by rationality alone.” I noted earlier that Ayn Rand was never anti-emotion.
But more important, a less than C--grade, trashy movie written by an enemy who nonetheless wanted to exploit her connection to Ayn Rand, cannot be taken seriously by anyone—and it wasn’t. We have no way of knowing what events in the movie really occurred and which Barbara Branden made-up.

Barbara Branden did not write or approve the movie script. Burns says that Branden's books was "transformed" into an "HBO" (not Showtime) movie.

The entire paragraph should be read. Burns says that many people got a very negative impression from Rand after reading the Branden biography and that this impression was further "reinforced" by the movie. It should be remembered that Burns (and also Barbara Branden) have many positive things to say about Rand.

50. p. 281: Burns claims that the Ayn Rand Institute has a “poor reputation.”
Again, she gives no documentation. Poor according to whom? The institute is skyrocketing in growth, popularity and influence (see its websites). No other allegedly Objectivist organization even comes close.

I think the ARI's poor reputation is so well-known that it doesn't need documentation. Who, other than a few ARI insiders, supports the ARI's rewriting of Rand's papers, as well the purges, excommuncations and fatwas by de facto chairman Leonard Peikoff? In 2007, Texas State University turned down an Anthem Foundation fellowship, it being common knowledge of the dogmatism that plagues the ARI.

BTW, what does Dr. Locke think of the rewriting of Rand's papers?

Larry Sechrest Discusses Objectivist Richard Salsman's Essay on the Great Depression

Missing the Mark: Salsman's Review of the Great Depression. published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies.

Here is Sechrest:

In effect, Salsman condemns virtually all economists as being deeply misguided and anti-business: Marxists, Keynesians, Progressives, Institutionalists, monetarists, even Austrians. This last constitutes a major departure from past orthodox Objectivist2 doctrine, since Ayn Rand (1967, 339–40) herself praised the economic theories—though not necessarily the philosophical stance—of Austrians such as Ludwig von Mises and Henry Hazlitt. Obviously, though he never states this explicitly, Salsman must think that Rand was gravely in error to have had high regard for Austrian economists.

Salsman has become prominent in Objectivist circles (some of his material is sold by the ARI's bookstore), so it will be interesting to see if Objectivism will develop its own economic theory now that George Reisman was booted out of the movement by Leonard Peikoff. However, Reisman's student Brian Simpson appears Austrian.

The McCaskey Schism, Part 2

Two months ago I gave the lowdown on the latest schism in Objectivism. I suggested that the schism had not yet reached the level of the David Kelley split in the 1980s. In two short months we’ve reached Kelley levels and may be heading for a schism of Brandenesque proportions.

By way of background, it should be noted that Leonard Peikoff is not on the Board of Directors of the Ayn Rand Institute (ARI) and does not appear to have the legal authority to veto its decisions. Rather, as the heir of Rand’s estate, the owner of her copyrights and the owner of her papers, a decision by Peikoff to separate from the ARI would probably hamper its day to day operations if not require its dissolution.

On October 24, Diana Hsieh published her evaluation of the McCaskey schism. Hsieh, who has a doctorate in philosophy, is the most prominent Objectivist blogger and podcaster. She is an interesting character. A long-time Objectivist, she was for ten years a supporter of David Kelley’s the Objectivist Center (now the Atlas Center). She was no admirer of Leonard Peikoff, criticizing his magnum opus Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR) and alleging that Peikoff lied in claiming Rand designated him her “intellectual heir.”

In 2004, however, Hsieh had a conversion experience to orthodox Objectivism in which all her previous criticism of the ARI and Leonard Peikoff suddenly became “inoperative.” In order to make up for lost time, she launched numerous attacks on the “false friends” of Objectivism. These included not just the usual suspects such as David Kelley and the Brandens, but her old friend Chris Sciabarra. Sciabarra is particularly loathed in ARI circles for his work Ayn Rand the Russian Radical, a book which puts Rand in historical context. In 2006, Hsieh, using private emails from Sciabarra without his permission, wrote a nasty hit piece. She repudiated her previous work. Leonard Peikoff now became a god in Hsieh’s eyes, even endorsing his 2006 fatwa on the moral obligation to vote for the Democratic Party.

Hsieh’s attempt to become Objectivism’s avenging angel worked, at least for a time. In a 2009 podcast, Leonard Peikoff said he respected her work. However, in June 2010 she disagreed (as did many Objectivists) with Peikoff’s contention that Moslems do not have the right to build an Islamic Community Center (which contains a mosque) near “ground zero” in New York City. (This was a dangerous position to take because Peikoff, as with the 2006 voting fatwa, had equated his position with Objectivism as such.) Nonetheless, she tried to be as respectful as possible to Peikoff, urging Objectivists not pester the Grand Old Man at the summer Objectivist Conference. Curiously, Hsieh reported, in September, that her proposal for a lecture at the 2011 ARI-sponsored Objectivist Conference (OCON) was rejected.

In preparation for her October 24 piece on the McCaskey schism, Hsieh wrote a couple letters to Peikoff asking for clarification concerning his now notorious email which, she said, “looked very bad on its face.” Peikoff did not respond or acknowledge the emails. She also spoke to McCaskey and ARI president Yaron Brook to get their side of the story. The most interesting bit of information in Hsieh’s piece was a letter that David Harriman sent to Hsieh’s husband, Paul (a medical doctor).

Date: Mon, Sep 20, 2010 at 1:30 PM

From: DAVID HARRIMAN

To: Paul Hsieh

Subject: Re: Question about McCaskey's criticisms of your book?

Dear Paul:

I don't think you need access to private emails in order to reach a judgment on this conflict.
Professor McCaskey has published a negative review of my book on Amazon. He has also published articles expressing some of his own views on induction, and praising the ideas of William Whewell (a 19th century Kantian). Anyone who is interested can read my book, read the writings of McCaskey, and come to their own judgment.

I realize that most people know little about the history of science, and so they may believe that they lack the specialized knowledge required to make a judgment in this case. But I do not think the basic issues are very complicated.

McCaskey claims that Galileo discovered the law of free fall without even understanding what is meant by "free fall" (since Galileo allegedly had no clear concept of friction). Likewise, Newton discovered his universal laws of motion without understanding the concepts of "inertia," "acceleration," and "momentum." In effect, scientists stumble around in the dark and somehow discover laws of nature before they grasp the constituent concepts. This view is typical of academic philosophers of science today. I am well acquainted with it; in my youth, I took courses from Paul Feyerabend at UC Berkeley. But how believable is it?

In short, I ask you which is more believable -- that Isaac Newton was fundamentally confused about the difference between "impetus" and "momentum," or that John McCaskey is confused about this issue?

A favorite pastime among academics today is to find "feet of clay" in great men. But that is not the purpose of my book.

Sincerely,
David

Of course contempt for academics and the claim that all non-Objectivists are “Kantians” is vintage Peikoff. And who needs expertise in the history of science to evaluate a book on the history of science when a little “thinking in essentials” will do the trick?

Hsieh’s piece generated lots of comments. The most interesting was from physicist Travis Norsen, who revealed that he had been critical of the Harriman book for quite some time, resulting in a “cooling” of his relationship with the ARI.

Now, ironically, during this same period, a dear friend convinced me to consider trying one last time to submit an OCON course proposal; in particular I was assured that, this time, such a proposal would receive a fair hearing. So, despite doubting that a proposal by me could possibly be accepted, I did end up submitting something. To my pleasure and surprise, it was accepted, and so I was slated to teach a course at the summer 2007 conference (in Colorado). But then, a couple months later (in December of 2006), I was informed by ARI that they were withdrawing the invitation for me to speak, based on the “views on induction generally and on Dr. Peikoff’s lectures more specifically” that I had posted here.
Norsen also reported that he was told that the ARI had need for only one lecturer on physics, and that was David Harriman.

Hsieh didn’t reach many conclusions in her piece, claiming that there wasn’t enough information available to determine just what Peikoff was up to in his “moral condemnation” of McCaskey. Trying not to get into too much trouble, she urged everyone to be understanding of Peikoff and acknowledge his contributions to Objectivism.

If Hsieh’s failure to support Peikoff 100% was surprising, things got even more surprising a couple weeks later when, on October 29, Craig Biddle attacked Peikoff for his “nonobjective” and “unjust” attack on McCaskey. Biddle publishes The Objective Standard (TOS), an Objectivist magazine that publishes only orthodox Objectivists and has close ties to the ARI. McCaskey is on the masthead along with ARI president Yaron Brook. TOS had published excerpts from Harriman’s book. You’d think Biddle would be the last person to turn on Peikoff. Just a few weeks previous Biddle published a fawning review of James Valliant’s now debunked The Passion of Ayn Rand’s Critics, even though it is out of print and orthodox Objectivists such as Hsieh have long stopped mentioning it. In his 2002 book Loving Life he called OPAR “one of the most important books ever written.”

Biddle removed Brook from the masthead of TOS, duly noting that he respects Brooks and does not want to sever ties with ARI writers. Lot of good that did him, because the next day he posted on Face Book that the ARI had cancelled his speaking engagements at several universities.

By now people were asking lots of questions, in particular students at the Objectivist Academic Center (OAC), a graduate program run by the ARI. Perhaps fearing that a decision by Peikoff to take his marbles and go home would result in OAC becoming another Founders College, they demanded a conference call with the ARI, which apparently took place in early November. The call was confidential.

Just when you thought things couldn’t get any weirder, Peikoff returned from on high on November 5 to settle scores. First he denounced McCaskey. Lest there be any doubts, he said was morally condemning McCaskey. (This had been disputed by certain Objectivists, apparently forgetting that virtually every condemnation is moral in Peikoff’s eyes).

Because some people have turned the dispute into a moral issue, I should state the full truth, which is not stated in the letter: I have, for years, long before Harriman’s book, condemned McCaskey morally: I regard him as an obnoxious braggart as a person, and a pretentious ignoramus as an intellectual. Had I held a more positive estimate, I would have attempted first of all not to demand his resignation, but to discuss the book with him, understand his viewpoint, and see if together we could resolve and/or delimit his problems with it. But given my opinion of him, intellectual discussion was impossible to me.
Next, he reminded people that as the one who allegedly best understands Objectivism, he is entitled to trump any decision of the ARI, notwithstanding the fact that he is not even on its Board of Directors.

Ultimately, someone has to decide who is qualified to hold such positions and where the line is to be drawn. An organization devoted to spreading an ideology is not compatible with “freedom” for its leadership to contradict or undermine that ideology. In theory, the best judge of such contradiction would be the person(s), if he exists, who best understands and upholds the ideology, as evidenced objectively by his lifelong intellectual consistency, philosophic attainments, and practical results. In practice, the best judge would be the person, if he is still alive, who founded the organization and defined its purpose, in this case as a step in carrying out a mandate given him by Ayn Rand. On both counts, only one individual qualifies: me. (I have retired from books, classes, and official position, but not from perception and evaluation.)

Next, he pointed out that he is on terms of “personal enmity” with “a few” Board members and doesn’t speak to them. Since there are eight Board members, Peikoff apparently isn’t on speaking terms with at least 40% of the Board.

Finally, in case anyone was wondering against whom Peikoff was directing his invective, he closed with “if . . . my detractors in this issue represent a sizable faction within the Objectivist movement whose spokesmen include magazine founders and PhDs with podcasts– then God help Objectivism, too.”

By now things had reached critical mass. With a “sizeable faction” of ARI supporters having questions about what little amount of intellectual freedom remains in orthodox Objectivism and a possible fall-off of contributions to the ARI, Yaron Brook decided to speak. The upshot of Brook’s press release is that Peikoff threatened to walk away from the ARI and the Board caved.

The substantive issue that Dr. Peikoff raised—whether a person who does not support a central ARI project should sit on the Board—was itself a very serious one. In addition, the Board had the practical, moral, and fiduciary responsibility to avoid needlessly damaging our important relationship with Dr. Peikoff. Dr. Peikoff founded ARI, served as its first Board chairman, and has continued to provide ARI with moral, financial, and practical support over the 25 years of ARI’s existence. As Ayn Rand’s heir, he has been very generous in giving Ayn Rand’s materials to the ARI Archives, with much more planned for the future. In these and many other ways, Dr. Peikoff’s ongoing support is important to ARI; we are certainly interested in hearing his thoughts and analyses, and we give them due weight in our deliberations

I won’t go into the details of Brook’s statement, which was brilliantly dissected by one “Saul” on Diana Hsieh’s blog. Of note, however, is that Brook does not say whether he considers Peikoff’s criticisms of McCaskey’s person (an obnoxious braggart and ignoramus) appropriate in light of McCaskey’s years of devotion to the ARI. Most importantly, we are never told why McCaskey had a “conflict of interest” as a Board member because he is unable to support the ARI-sponsored The Logical Leap. Is McCaskey obligated to support a work that is, at most, an extension of Objectivism? I don’t get the impression that McCaskey was out to publicly “trash” The Logical Leap or the ARI for sponsoring it. Rather it looks like he intended on keeping his criticism private.

We now have more information about this schism, although there is a great deal we don’t know. Most importantly we know that Peikoff’s denunciation of McCaskey is the culmination of his attempt to make David Harriman the official Objectivist expert on physics and science, notwithstanding his eccentric view on relativity theory and some other matters. In my initial piece I raised the suspicion that Peikoff’s anger might have something to do with the Archives granting access to Jennifer Burns for her critical biography of Rand. I thought that ARI supporters might be angry over Burns’ revelation that the ARI, apparently at Peikoff’s direction or at least consent, has rewritten Rand’s posthumously published material. That doesn’t appear to have been a factor.

The McCaskey schism is the logical culmination of Peikovianism. When Peikoff excommunicated David Kelley he implicitly put his interpretation of Objectivism on par with Rand’s stated positions. This was made explicit in the 2006 Fatwa and the New York City Mosque podcast. Now with the McCaskey auto-da-fe Peikoff has made his extension of Objectivism into an area on which Rand wrote nothing as much a part of Objectivism as anything that Rand wrote. If the DIM Hypothesis ever appears will Objectivists be free to express the mildest disagreements?

Leonard Peikoff Answers My Question On Immigration

I thank Dr. Peikoff for answering my question.